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The decision as to whether a medical doctor, or other
expensive specialist, should be carried aboard ship depends upon
demand for service, consequences of not providing this service,
and cost of providing the service. We supply a simple preliminary
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1 . Introduction .
The purpose of this paper is to initiate study of the question:
should expensive specialists, e.g. medical doctors, be assigned to
ships or submarines on patrol? The issues that arise are as follows.
(1) If a man is injured or becomes seriously ill while a
mission is in progress, and if no doctor is present, it may be necessary
to transfer the individual from the ship to a hospital for treatment.
Presence of a doctor will, at least in some cases, permit the treatment
to take place on the ship. Thus the cost of the transfer may be
eliminated—at, of course, the expense of maintaining the doctor.
Similarly, but not entirely analogously, breakdown of key
equipment entails loss of military effectiveness and may require that
the mission be prematurely terminated. If a skilled specialist is
aboard such events may be forestalled.
(2) The cost of retaining doctors or other trained specialists
is very high. The cost for such a specialist may rightfully include
some of the expense of his original recruitment and training.
One subsidiary purpose of this paper is to show that the use
of simulation methods is not always essential when dealing with problems
of some complexity, and, in particular, those that involve chance
effects.
2 . The Occurrence of Demands .
Basic to the question of whether a doctor or highly trained
and expensive repairman should be added to a ship's complement is the
likelihood of demand for services that he alone can supply. We pro-
pose some probability models for this question. Actually, a complex
variety of sources may conspire to cause demand.
Model 1 . Simple Chance Demand, Caused by Accidents or Sudden Disease.
Imagine that a ship has n individuals aboard when it sets
out on a mission of duration M. Each individual is thought to have
a constant probability Xdt of experiencing an accident or sudden
severe illness between t and t + dt, dt being a small number.
The occurrence of accidents or illness is first assumed to be independ-
ent from individual to individual. Then our simple model implies that
each individual experiences his demanding event at time T. (i = l,2,...,n)
measured from the start of the mission, T. being distributed in
accordance with an exponential distribution with rate parameter A:
P{T. a! t} - 1 - e~At ^ t < »
(2.1)
- t < 0.
Next, the occurrence of the smallest T. on the ship of crew size
l
n is the distribution of the minimum of a sample of n independent
T.'s, which is exponential with parameter n . Let us call this
time t ; then
n
P{x > t} - e"nXt <; t < «
n
(2.2)
= 1 t <
According to this model, if no doctor (or repairman) is present:
(A) The probability that the mission does not terminate during M
for the cause associated with A is
P{x
n
> M} = e nXM (2.3)
(B) The expected time to the scheduled end of a mission that
involves a rescue (or terminates early) is
Q (M-x)e nAdx
E[M - t t < M] =





It is of interest to see what this formula approaches as A becomes
small, a condition likely to be true in practice. Write (2.4) as
-nAM
T-r™ I vm e - 1 + nAME[M - t t < M] = —
n ' n , , W1 -nAM.(nA)(l-e )














This states that in the limit of vanishingly small accident or disease
rate and average of one-half the mission time will be lost, provided
that the probability is very small of an accident or breakdown of the
sort envisioned (e.g. a heart attack, stroke, severe injury, in the
medical case)
.
Model 2 . Chance Demand, Differing Demand Rates.
We can realistically generalize Model 1 to the situation for
which each individual has a different characteristic rate or probability
of requiring the vital service: X.dt is essentially the demand
probability for individual j (j = 1,2, . . . ,n) . Then the overall
demand rate is, assuming independence, equal to
X(n) = X, + X + ... X (2.6)
i 2. n
and the distribution of t is still exponential, with X(n) replacing
n
nX in (2.2). All this is well-known; see Feller [1].
Practically speaking, one might consider classes of individuals
who are more or less susceptible to disease or accident, and who can
be characterized by the same failure or catastrophe rates within the
class. For example, the older officers (ship captain, executive
officer, etc.) are probably less prone to incur an appendicitis outbreak
than would a younger man; on the other hand, an older person might be
more prone to heart attack. This sort of consideration would compel
us to put individuals into classes, with characteristic rates
{A', u = 1,2, . .
.
, c } ; then
u
c
X(n) = I n(u)A' (2.7)
u=l U
where n(u) is the number of individuals in the u— class.
BuMed data might well be available to provide estimates for
the above rates. For equipments, 3M data might well be interpreted
for the same purpose.
Model 3 . Simple Chance Demand, Demand Rates Randomly Selected from a
Population.
An interesting and realistic generalization of Model 2 involves
the assumption that each individual's "failure" or demand rate is
itself randomly and independently drawn from some fixed population.
An immediate generalization, in the spirit of Model 2, is that
certain classes of individuals' demand rates come from different
populations.
To explore this sort of assumption we first write down the
survival probability of the group (crew), given their failure rates.
This turns out to be, by independence, equal to
P{t > x \ , X , ..., X } e
n l / n
n >
Now by assumption each X . is independently drawn from a population
with distribution H(y) , and density h(y). Consequently, removal





yx h(y)dy = [h(x)
]
n
where h(x) represents the Laplace transform of the density h,









- (i)a+x ; (2.9)
and the chance that a mission proceeds with no demand is




It will also be interesting to derive the expected lost mission time










] = (M-x)e"X(n)x A(n)dx
= M[l - e"A(n)M ] - r4r [1 - (l+A(n)M)e-X(n)M ]
M __L_ „ _ e"X(n)M
X(n) U J (2.11)
Next the conditions on the X's must be removed. This can be done
easily in terms of our gamma density illustration.
Example , h is Gamma.
Then X(n) is Gamma with parameters a and $n. Consequently,
we need
|_X(n) J
, , v gn-1
I e



















u _ .Bn-1 , a+M f a /n[(orHOy] dy = e^l^ (2<13)y(a+M) r(Bn)





] ^-^r + ^n^M)
3n
(2.14)
A generalization can be carried out for the case in which several sub-
groups of crew members are described by their specific gamma distribu-
tions, but this step will be postponed.
3. Costs and Decisions
.
Armed with various models that describe demand for service by
a medical doctor or other specialist we can formulate decision analyses.
Our demand models provide inputs to these analyses, as do certain costs.
Decision Model 1 .
Suppose ship missions are of approximately constant duration
M. Let D be the (dollar) cost per unit time of maintaining a
medical doctor aboard ship. Then MD is the dollar cost per mission
of keeping the doctor aboard ship while the ship is engaged in an
active mission.
Let R be the cost of the evacuation or rescue operation
necessary when an emergency arises and no doctor is present. Think
of R as being an average cost; clearly this cost will vary with the
location of the ship, and hence the individual, that is the recipient
of the rescue attempt.
Let p(n;M) denote the expected number of emergencies that
arise when a crew of n individuals embark on a mission of duration
M. Our models of Section 2 provide various bases for evaluating
p(n;M).
Model 1 implies that the number of demands during a mission is
-AM
binomially distributed with mean p(n;M) = n(l-e ). Suppose that
each emergency requires a separate rescue or evacuation operation.
Then the expected cost of rescues or evacuations in p(n;M)R per mission
if a doctor is not aboard. Presume that if a doctor is aboard all of
10
these can be avoided, but at cost MD . The optimal decision rule is
then
-XMCarry a doctor if MD < n(l-e ' )R
-XM
Do not carry a doctor if MD > n(l-e ' )R
(3.1)
If X is quite small, as should often be true, this becomes a good
approximation!
Carry a doctor if D < n X R
(3.2)
Do not carry a doctor if D > n X R.
Of course if there is equality (D = nXR, for example) then other
considerations must settle the matter.
Decision Model 2 .
This model simply recognizes the differences between demand
(injury, accident, or sickness) rates between individuals, as in Demand
Model 2. For that model the expected number of demands is
n -X.M




Hence our decision rule becomes
n -X.M






Do not carry a doctor if MD > R £ (1-e ^ )
j=l
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Some additional comments may be made on these models.
(A) The models tacitly assume that R, the cost of a rescue
operation, is the same regardless of mission. In fact, one can assign
a cost that depends upon the mission and then decide on the basis of
our various decision models whether a doctor can be justified.
(B) The same comment as in (A) above holds for the rates or
X-values likely to prevail on different missions.
(C) The above decision rules, derived for ships, can apply
also to groups of ships. The doctor can be located on one ship of
the group, and emergencies will then be transferred to that ship when
they occur.
(D) In the above discussion the X-values are taken to be
known. To make the decision we must obtain estimates, and then treat
these estimates as equal to the parameter values actually prevailing.
A more sophisticated approach explicitly recognizes that estimates
are uncertain; one standard way of handling that situation is by
means of Bayesian decision theory. We shall apply these ideas in a
later report.
The above decision models assume that emergencies generate
rescue costs, but do not shorten missions. In other situations, perhaps
having to do with the failure of a major weapon system, this might not
be the case. It may well be that if a major system goes out on, say,
a submarine, the latter must return to port prematurely. We set up a
simple and tentative model for this situation, anticipating that refine-
ments in the model may suggest themselves.
12
Decision Model 3 .
Suppose the initial cost for a copy of the ship in question is
S (dollars) , and that the anticipated life is equivalent to L missions
g
of length M. It is reasonable to assess a penalty of — dollars
per unit time that the ship is not carrying out its assigned task
during a mission, owing to lack of specialized repair personnel or
spare parts.
The expected lost time per mission of length M is obtained
for Demand Model 1 by multiplying (2.4) by the probability of at least
one demand during M, namely 1 - e . Thus






Thus the expected cost of lost service if a specialist, or requisite
spares, are not carried over the life of the ship is
Expected cost = Q L E[max(M-x ,0)n
nXM
(3.5)
The optimal decision rule is then derived from the principle that one
should carry the specialist if his total cost over the life of the
ship, MLD, is less than the expected cost of curtailed missions:
-nXM
Carry specialist if MLD < s|l - -





A very similar formula can be written down if Demand Model 2 is invoked,
Note that n now refers to the number of failure-prone equipments
to be serviced by the specialist.
One qualitative fact that emerges from (3.6) is that for fixed
total mission time ML = T one can reduce the need for a specialist
by shortening mission time, M, (and correspondingly increasing L)
.
By indefinitely shortening M the right-hand side of (3.6) can be
brought very close to zero, which guarantees that our decision rule
will recommend that the specialist be left ashore. Of course, indefi-
nite shortening of the mission time is impractical, but the tendency
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